A data-driven surveillance approach has become the dominant narrative in discussions about how China maintains its power. Whether it’s the private sector’s daily collection, analysis, and censorship of billions of social media posts, or the state’s extensive monitoring of social activity through movement tracking, payment records, and simple observation, the Chinese authorities seem to have a unique level of creativity when it comes to preventing citizens from expressing dissent.
While the storage and analysis of social media activity is now commonplace in Western democracies, with social media companies routinely collecting data to sell to advertisers, the idea of the state itself building a comprehensive, high-tech surveillance network to monitor citizens’ every move is far more striking. This system aims to evaluate behavior and assign scores that can lead to either sanctions or rewards.
While such a system offers flexibility in implementing new policies, it also comes with the challenge of needing new definitions and rules for each policy, which can vary from region to region. This can quickly lead to significant fragmentation (Drinhausen and Brussee 2021). Moreover, there’s a general lack of clarity about how data is transformed into “credit.” As Drinhausen and Brussee (2021) point out, there isn’t even a consistent definition of “credit.” Liang et al. (2018) suggest that this may be due to the term “credit” having multiple meanings in the Chinese language. However, they have managed to create a schematic outline of the data collection, processing, and evaluation process (p. 427) and have also detailed the numerous government agencies that contribute data to the Social Credit System (p. 430).
In a Nutshell
Key Focus:
- Examines how China uses its Social Credit System and digital surveillance to govern.
- Applies Foucault's concept of "governmentality" to understand these practices.
- Analyzes strategies like repression, legitimation, and information acquisition.
Key Arguments:
- China's system is a form of disciplinary power, with elements of biopower emerging.
- The government uses a mix of old and new techniques to maintain control.
- Digital technology allows for unprecedented levels of surveillance and control.
Relevance:
- Provides insight into how authoritarian regimes adapt in the digital age.
- Raises questions about the future of individual rights and freedoms.
- Contributes to discussions about the global implications of China's approach to governance.
I will describe how the Social Credit System works and how it fits into the broader context of Chinese surveillance and repression. To do this, it will first examine the concept of governmentality, building on the work of Michel Foucault and later Mitchell Dean. In short, the central question is: “How does China make its population governable?”
To answer this, we will apply Foucault’s concepts of visibilities, technologies, forms of knowledge, and identities to the case of China. The well-known strategies of authoritarian rule will be categorized as techniques of different basic forms of governmentality (sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower). This will provide a structured view of the actions of the Chinese government. Ultimately, the paper will address the question of what the main focus of the Chinese government’s governmentality is.
Understanding Authoritarian Power: Foucault’s Ideas on Governmentality
When we talk about how governments control their people, we often focus on things like laws, armies, and police. But French philosopher Michel Foucault offered a more nuanced way of understanding power, one that goes beyond these obvious tools of control. He developed the concept of “governmentality,” which helps us analyze how power operates in different societies and historical periods.
What is Governmentality?
Foucault used the term governmentality to describe the specific way a government thinks about and manages its population. It’s about the “ensemble formed by the institutions, the precedents, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics” that allow a government to exercise power (Foucault 2020, 162) . Instead of just focusing on the state and its institutions, governmentality looks at the broader range of practices and knowledge that shape how people are governed. This includes not only the actions of the state, but also the ways in which individuals and groups within society regulate themselves and others.
Mitchell Dean, building on Foucault’s work, suggests that governmentality is made up of four key elements. First, there are the visibilities, which is how a government defines the problems it seeks to address. This involves identifying what is considered important, what needs to be measured, and what kinds of information are relevant for governing (Dean 2010, 37). For example, a government might focus on issues like crime rates, economic growth, or public health. Second, there are the technologies and practices that a government uses to govern. These can range from laws and regulations to more subtle forms of control, such as surveillance, education, and propaganda (ibid, p. 39). These technologies are not simply tools that the government uses, but also shape the way that individuals behave and interact with each other. Third, there are the forms of knowledge that inform government practices. Governmentality relies on specific kinds of knowledge about the population it governs. This knowledge might be produced by experts in fields like economics, sociology, or medicine, and it is used to justify and guide government action (Dean 2010, 39). Fourth, there are the identities that a particular form of government seeks to create. Governmentality is not just about controlling people’s behavior; it’s also about shaping their sense of self. Governments often promote certain identities as desirable, such as the “ideal citizen,” and discourage others (Oels 2010, 173).
In essence, governmentality is about how governments shape our understanding of ourselves, our relationships with others, and our place in society. It’s a way of thinking about power that emphasizes the complex and often subtle ways in which we are governed.
Foucault’s Three Types of Governmentality
Foucault identified three major forms of governmentality that have emerged in Western history. The oldest of these is sovereign power, which is characterized by the absolute authority of a ruler. In this model, the sovereign has the right to use force and make laws as they see fit. The sovereign’s power is often seen as deriving from divine right or tradition, and it is focused on maintaining order and defending the territory (Foucault 2020, 152). The second form, disciplinary power, emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries and is associated with the rise of institutions like prisons, schools, and factories. Disciplinary power seeks to control individuals by regulating their behavior and movements. It operates through techniques like surveillance, normalization, and examination, which aim to produce docile and productive subjects (ibid., S. 164). The third and most modern form is biopower, which focuses on the management of populations. Biopower is concerned with issues like public health, birth rates, and economic growth. It seeks to optimize the well-being of the population as a whole, operating through statistical analysis, public health campaigns, and other techniques that target the population as a collective entity (ibid., S. 164 f.).
These three forms of governmentality are not mutually exclusive. Later forms of power often incorporate elements of earlier ones. For example, modern states still use laws and prisons, which are associated with sovereign and disciplinary power, but they also employ sophisticated techniques to manage the health and well-being of their citizens, which is an example of biopower (Oels 2010). Understanding these different forms of power can help us to see how government has evolved over time and how it operates in contemporary society.
The Three Forms of Governmentality according to Foucault’s lecture on February 1, 1978 (Oels 2010)
| First appeared historically |
In the Middle Ages |
15th-16th Century |
| Goal of governing |
Maintaining the sovereign’s power over the territory |
Disposition over things to direct them towards a suitable purpose |
| Visibilities |
Territory |
Individual bodies |
| Technologies |
Legal norm |
Normalization through discipline, control, and surveillance |
| Forms of knowledge |
Advice to the prince |
Art of governing (I) the self (morality) (II) the family (economy) (III) the state (politics) Reason of state Police science |
| Identities |
Subject of law |
Normalized subject |
Authoritarian Rule in the Digital Age
We will use Foucault’s concept of governmentality to analyze how authoritarian states, particularly China, use technology to control their populations. We will examine the specific strategies these regimes employ, such as surveillance, propaganda, and repression, and how these strategies fit within Foucault’s framework. By doing so, we hope to gain a deeper understanding of how authoritarian power operates in the 21st century. The rise of digital technology has created new opportunities for authoritarian states to monitor and control their citizens, raising important questions about the future of freedom and democracy.
The Dictator’s Dilemma
One of the key challenges faced by authoritarian rulers is what Wintrobe (1998) called the “dictator’s dilemma.” This refers to the problem that dictators face in knowing whether their people genuinely support them or are simply afraid to express their true feelings. Because dissent can be dangerous, people may pretend to be loyal even when they are not. This makes it difficult for dictators to gauge the true level of opposition to their rule. This dilemma is particularly acute in the digital age, where online platforms provide new avenues for dissent but also new tools for surveillance and repression.
In response to this dilemma, dictators often resort to increased repression, which only exacerbates the problem by further discouraging people from speaking out. This can create a vicious cycle of fear and distrust, making it even harder for the regime to maintain its grip on power. Moreover, the use of technology to monitor and control the population can create a climate of anxiety and self-censorship, further distorting the flow of information and making it even more difficult for the dictator to understand the true feelings of the people.
How Authoritarian Rulers Stay in Power: A Range of Strategies
Authoritarian rulers employ a variety of strategies to maintain their grip on power. This article will discuss the tactics outlined by Gerschewski et al. (2012) and Brancati (2014), examining their characteristics and providing examples where possible. We will also explore how these strategies relate to Michel Foucault’s concepts of governmentality. This analysis will help us understand the specific nature of autocratic rule in China and how it compares to other forms of governance.
Repression: The Iron Fist
Repression is perhaps the most obvious tool in the authoritarian toolbox. It involves the use or threat of sanctions to control the population and suppress dissent (cf. in Gerschewski et al. 2012, 10). These sanctions can range from mild to severe, targeting anyone deemed a potential threat to the regime.
Authoritarian regimes often employ both “harsh” and “soft” forms of repression. Harsh measures include the use of physical violence against opposition figures or groups. The Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 is a stark reminder of the brutality that authoritarian regimes are capable of when faced with a challenge to their authority. Such acts of violence serve not only to eliminate immediate threats but also to send a chilling message to the wider population.
However, repression is not always so overt. Soft forms of repression, such as censorship, are also effective in controlling the flow of information and preventing the spread of dissenting ideas. While democracies also engage in censorship to some extent, autocracies wield it far more broadly to suppress political criticism and shape public opinion.
The question of what to censor is a complex one for authoritarian regimes. Unlike democracies, where censorship is often limited by legal and constitutional protections, autocracies face a different calculus. As Wintrobe (1998) argues, suppressing all forms of criticism can deprive the regime of valuable feedback and lead to instability.
Chinese censors, as King, Pan, and Roberts (2013) have shown, are adept at this balancing act. They strategically target speech that has “collective action potential,” meaning expressions of discontent that could mobilize people to resist. This approach allows the regime to maintain control without completely stifling public discourse.
From a Foucauldian perspective, harsh repression aligns with “disciplinary power,” which focuses on controlling individuals through punishment and surveillance. The use of imprisonment and violence sends a clear message: dissent will be met with severe consequences.
Soft repression, on the other hand, draws on both disciplinary power and “biopower.” The Social Credit Score System (SCS) in China, for example, uses rewards and punishments to shape behavior and promote conformity. While it may not involve physical violence, it operates through a system of incentives and penalties that can have a profound impact on people’s lives. The SCS also reflects elements of biopower, as the vast amounts of data collected allow the state to identify and manage the population as a whole, anticipating and preventing potential threats to stability.
Legitimation: Winning Hearts and Minds (or at Least Acquiescence)
Authoritarian regimes, lacking the democratic legitimacy that comes from free and fair elections, must work hard to justify their rule in other ways. Gerschewski et al. (2012) define legitimation as “the belief in the legitimacy of the regime” (p. 8). In other words, the people must, to some degree, accept the regime’s right to govern.
To achieve this, authoritarian rulers employ a range of strategies aimed at generating both specific and diffuse support. Specific support is based on the regime’s performance in delivering tangible benefits to the population, such as economic growth, social order, and security. If the regime is successful in these areas, people may be willing to tolerate a lack of political freedom in exchange for a better life. However, this support is contingent and can quickly disappear if the regime fails to meet these expectations.
Diffuse support, on the other hand, is less tied to immediate outcomes and more to long-term beliefs and attitudes. Authoritarian regimes cultivate this type of support through various channels, including ideology, nationalism, religion, historical narratives, and the charisma of individual leaders. These tools aim to create a sense of national unity, common purpose, and shared identity, fostering loyalty and a sense of belonging.
In China, for example, the CCP promotes a state ideology rooted in Maoist thought, while President Xi Jinping has emphasized a nationalist vision of the “Chinese Dream.” This narrative of national rejuvenation, which draws on historical grievances and seeks to restore China to its former glory, aims to galvanize popular support and create a sense of national unity. However, the regime’s treatment of ethnic minorities, such as the Uighurs, highlights the complex and often contradictory nature of legitimacy-building in authoritarian states.
From a Foucauldian perspective, efforts to establish diffuse legitimacy often rely on biopower, which is concerned with shaping the identity and beliefs of the population. Specific legitimacy, on the other hand, operates more through disciplinary power, using incentives and disincentives to encourage desired behaviors. The Social Credit System, with its system of rewards and punishments, is a prime example of this strategy.
Kooptation: Buying Loyalty
Another key strategy for authoritarian rulers is kooptation, which involves building a regime-supporting alliance by providing benefits to key elites (Gerschewski et al. 2012, 11). These elites, who may control valuable resources such as military force, economic capital, or political influence, are incentivized to remain loyal to the regime in exchange for continued privileges.
This strategy is similar to specific legitimation, but with a narrower focus. Instead of appealing to the general population, it targets influential individuals or groups whose support is crucial for the regime’s survival. These benefits can take many forms, such as subsidies, tax breaks, or exclusive rights to valuable resources.
The relationship between the Chinese government and the country’s tech industry provides a good example of these dynamics. Figures like Jack Ma have amassed enormous wealth under the CCP’s rule, and their companies have, by and large, supported the regime. While the exact mechanisms of this relationship can be complex and involve both cooperation and control, it’s clear that the government has used a combination of incentives and pressure to secure the support of this powerful sector.
Cooptation draws on both sovereign and disciplinary power. It involves using laws and regulations to create incentives, but it also relies on disciplinary measures to ensure compliance.
Signaling: Projecting Strength
Authoritarian regimes also employ a strategy called signaling, which involves using various means to project an image of strength and invincibility to their opponents (Brancati 2014). This can involve staging elections or referendums with overwhelmingly positive results, organizing large-scale public displays of support, or orchestrating media campaigns to showcase the regime’s power and control.
The goal of signaling is to discourage dissent and demobilize potential challengers by convincing them that resistance is futile. Even if these displays of strength are based on manipulation or fraud, they can be effective in creating a perception of invincibility.
While genuine elections are absent in China, the regime does engage in other forms of signaling, such as carefully choreographed public events and the suppression of any information that might suggest weakness or instability.
Signaling can draw on both disciplinary power, through the overt use or threat of force, and sovereign power, through the manipulation of legal processes and the dissemination of propaganda.
Credible Commitment: Reassuring the Economic Elite
Credible commitment is a strategy aimed at reassuring economic elites that their investments are safe from state expropriation (Brancati 2014). By establishing legal guarantees and demonstrating a commitment to protecting property rights, the regime seeks to foster a stable economic environment and encourage investment.
Authoritarian regimes understand that economic growth is crucial for maintaining stability and preventing popular unrest. To achieve this growth, they need the support of economic elites, who control capital and expertise.
China has pursued its own version of this strategy, gradually liberalizing its financial regulations and making it easier for foreign companies to invest in the country (Lardy 2021). Projects like the Belt and Road Initiative also signal to domestic and foreign investors that their investments are secure and that the government is committed to long-term economic development.
Credible commitment relies primarily on the instruments of sovereign power, particularly lawmaking.
Monitoring: Keeping an Eye on Your Own
Finally, authoritarian regimes employ monitoring, which involves using various mechanisms to keep track of potential threats and dissent within the ruling apparatus itself (Brancati 2014). This can involve surveillance of lower-level elites by higher-ups, as well as internal investigations and purges to root out corruption or disloyalty.
In China, as Lorentzen (2009) describes, a degree of press liberalization has allowed the central leadership to uncover wrongdoing at the local level. However, this strategy also carries risks, as exposing problems can fuel public discontent.
Monitoring is a technique of disciplinary power, aimed at maintaining order and control within the system and preventing any one faction from becoming too powerful.
Examples of the Application of Strategies of Authoritarian Rule
| Repression |
|
Harsh |
|
| Legitimation |
|
Specific legitimation |
Diffuse legitimation |
| Cooptation |
Legislation/tax benefits |
Incentives |
|
| Signaling |
Active obstruction of elections (repression) |
|
|
| Information Acquisition |
|
|
Social media evaluations |
| Credible Commitment |
Liberalization of financial regulations |
|
|
| Monitoring |
Surveillance via the press |
|
|
China’s Governmentality: A 21st-Century Twist on Authoritarian Rule
So, what does all this tell us about how China governs its people? We’ve seen that the Chinese government draws on all of Foucault’s basic forms of governmentality, but with a particular emphasis on disciplinary power. While sovereign power (the power to make and enforce laws) is present in all states, including authoritarian ones, it’s the focus on disciplining the population that really stands out in China.
Mitchell Dean, in his book “Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society,” argues that authoritarian governmentality is a mix of biopower and sovereignty. But this view, written in the 1990s, doesn’t quite capture the dynamics we see in China today.
Many of China’s strategies rely heavily on disciplining the population, bringing to mind Foucault’s concept of the panopticon – a system of surveillance where individuals are constantly aware of being watched. This is also reminiscent of neoliberal governmentality, with its emphasis on performance indicators and rewards and punishments based on those indicators.
However, we can’t ignore the elements of biopower at play in China. The regime’s use of nationalist narratives and its treatment of the Uighurs in Xinjiang reveal a disturbing trend towards ethnonationalism, with potentially grave consequences for local minorities.
Looking ahead, the expansion of digital surveillance and the push for a unified Social Credit System (SCS) suggest some new developments. The algorithmic control of behavior has the potential to move beyond individual discipline towards a broader concern with security. The state aims to identify and preempt undesirable behavior, using surveillance data to manage the population as a whole. In this sense, disciplinary power and biopower are merging into a new form, where the panopticon of individual surveillance is used to achieve biopolitical goals.
Back to topReferences
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